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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-THE "BOTTOM LINE" DE-
FENSE IN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct.
2525 (1982).
Four black employees of the Connecticut Department of In-
come Maintenance were provisionally promoted to the position of
Welfare Eligibility Supervisor. To attain permanent status as super-
visors they had to participate in a selection process which required a
passing score on a written examination. The results showed that
54.17% of all black candidates made a passing score on the written
examination which was approximately 68% of the passing rate of the
white candidates. The passing rate for whites was 79.54%. After
failing the written examination, the four employees sued in federal
district court, arguing that the use of the written examination was
improper because it screened out blacks at a much higher rate than
whites. The lawsuit was brought under Title VII of The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972,' and named the State of Connecticut, two state
agencies and two state officials as defendants.
After the lawsuit was instituted the defendants made promo-
tions from the eligibility list generated by the written examination
and applied an affirmative action program. The resulting promo-
tion rate for black candidates was 22.9%, compared with a promo-
tion rate of 13.5% for whites.
The defendants argued that this was a favorable "bottom line"
since the result of the promotion process was that black candidates
were not disproportionately denied the promotions, but in fact were
promoted more frequently than white candidates. The defendants
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 703(a) of Title VII provides
in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id at § 2000e-2(a). Section 701 of Title VII sets out applicable definitions to the Act at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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claimed that this result was a complete defense to the plaintiffs' law-
suit over the written examination, the portion of the promotion pro-
cess which had an adverse impact on black candidates. The district
court held for the defendants. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the defendants' argument and held that if any portion of a
selection process has an adverse impact on minority candidates
under Title VII, a favorable bottom line result will not redeem the
discriminatory portion. The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed.2 The Court held that the favorable bottom line of a selec-
tion process will not prevent a plaintiff from making out a prima
facie case of disparate impact under Title VII and will not serve as a
defense when the plaintiff alleges a portion of the total selection pro-
cess is discriminatory. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, prohibits discrimina-
tion by employers, employment agencies and labor organizations on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.3
Title VII was the first major, comprehensive piece of federal
legislation prohibiting discrimination in private employment.4 The
Act was amended in 1972 to prohibit discrimination by federal, state
and local government employers. 5
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits both discrim-
inatory treatment of statutorily protected individuals and the use of
facially neutral employment practices that have an adverse impact
2. Justice Brennan wrote for the majority in the five-four decision.
3. See note 1 and accompanying text.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
The legislative history of Title VII suggests that one of the major concerns of Congress
in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to remedy the denial of job opportunities
to minority citizens. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (1982); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971).
Several Senate and House Committee Reports were made concerning the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 which indicate that Congress sought to end employment discrimination. The
reports noted: "The basic purpose of H.R. 405 is to seek to eliminate arbitrary employment
discrimination because of race, religion, color, national origin, or ancestry, through the utili-
zation of formal and informal procedures." H.R. Rep. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1963); "The purpose of S. 1732 is to achieve a peaceful and voluntary settlement of the
persistent problem of racial or religious discrimination or segregation by establishments do-
ing business with the general public, and by labor unions and professional, business and
trade associations." S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964); "The purpose of this bill
is to secure to all persons of all races, colors, religions and nationalities the right to share
equally and fairly in the opportunities for employment throughout the range of the national
economy." S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964).
5. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, ch. 4, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat.
103 (1972).
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upon a protected group.6 These two theories of recovery are known,
respectively, as disparate treatment and disparate impact.
In disparate treatment, an individual is intentionally treated
differently on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
For example, disparate treatment occurs when an employer hires
only blacks to fill the most menial, lowest paying jobs, yet routinely
hires whites who have no better qualifications for higher paying,
more responsible positions. On the other hand, in a disparate im-
pact case, it is a facially neutral practice that has an adverse impact
on a member of a minority group. Such a practice, for example,
may be a high school diploma requirement. In a given area of the
country the minority population may have fewer high school gradu-
ates than the nonminority populace. A business practice of hiring
only high school graduates would have an adverse impact on those
minority applicants lacking diplomas. Connecticut v. Teal is a dis-
parate impact case.
The Supreme Court distinguished the two theories in a series of
decisions beginning in 1971. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. is a seminal
case in Title VII litigation and deals with disparate impact.7 In
Griggs the employer required a high school diploma or satisfactory
scores on two professionally prepared aptitude tests for an employee
to be eligible to be hired or for interdepartmental transfer. These
requirements disproportionately screened out blacks. Neither the
high school education requirement nor the general intelligence test
were shown to bear a relationship to successful job performance.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibited an employment practice which oper-
ates to exclude a protected group if the practice cannot be shown to
be related to job performance.8
Shortly after Griggs, the Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, addressed the theory of discriminatory treatment.9
McDonnell Douglas involved an allegedly discriminatory refusal to
hire a black because of his color and his involvement in civil rights
activities. In McDonnell Douglas the Supreme Court enunciated the
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a general discussion, see Furnish, A Path Through the
Maze:" Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REV. 419, 421 (1982).
8. The Court in Griggs noted that a business practice, such as job hiring or advance-
ment, which has an adverse impact on a protected minority is prohibited by Title VII unless
justified by "business necessity". Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
9. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
19831
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proofs necessary for a prima facie case of disparate treatment.' 0
The next significant Supreme Court employment discrimina-
tion case dealt with disparate impact. In Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody" the Court expanded on the requirements for recovery
under the disparate impact theory, ruling that even if a defendant
has justified a practice having an adverse impact on minorities, a
plaintiff can still prevail if he can show that less discriminatory al-
ternative practices were available to the employer.'2
A later Supreme Court decision, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, noted that an employer need not have
discriminatory intent to be liable under the disparate impact the-
ory.' 3 Under this decision the employer is deprived of a "good
faith" defense in a disparate impact action.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) de-
veloped guidelines for use in determining whether a business prac-
tice has an adverse impact on a protected minority. The federal
agency, which is charged with enforcement of Title VII, chose what
is known as a "bottom line" approach. If the total number of mi-
nority members hired or promoted does not reflect discrimination,
the EEOC will not normally take enforcement action even though
one portion of the business' selection procedure does have an ad-
verse impact on the protected group.' 4 The Supreme Court ruled, in
both Griggs and Albemarle, that the EEOC guidelines are entitled to
"great deference," thus federal courts have allowed the bottom line
defense even when the plaintiff is a private individual, rather than
the EEOC.15
10. Id at 802. Other cases have contributed to an understanding of the burdens of
proof for disparate treatment enumerated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. See International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
11. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
12. Id at 425. See, e.g., Ramirez v. City of Omaha, 538 F. Supp. 7, 11-12 (D. Neb.
1981), aft'd, 678 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1982); I.M.A.G.E. v. Bailar, 518 F. Supp. 800, 803 (N.D.
Cal. 1981).
But cf. Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980) (burden on
employer to prove there is no alternative to the challenged practice); Green v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975) (employer must show business necessity and no
acceptable alternative).
13. International Bhd of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. See also Griggs, 401 U.S. at
432.
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C) (1978).
15. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 430-31; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34. See, e.g., Ra-
mirez v. City of Omaha, 538 F. Supp. 7, 12 (D. Neb. 1981), ail'd, 678 F.2d 751 (8th Cir.
478 [Vol. 6:475
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Basing its decision on Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and its prog-
eny, the Supreme Court characterized Connecticut v. Teal as a dis-
parate impact case, and held that the burdens of proof for disparate
impact applied. Under the Griggs rationale the plaintiff first had to
show that a facially neutral employment practice, such as one used
in hiring or promotion, had a significant detrimental effect on a mi-
nority. 6 Once the plaintiffs prima facie case was established, the
employer must then prove that the questioned practice was justi-
fied. 7 If the employer has met this burden and successfully raised
this defense, a plaintiff may still prevail if he can show that the prac-
tice was merely a "pretext" to discriminate.' 8
The majority in Teal ruled that the defendants' written exami-
nation used in their promotion process had a significant detrimental
effect on blacks by screening them out at a disproportionate rate.' 9
The Court therefore concluded that the examination violated the
civil rights of the plaintiffs under section 703(a)(2) of Title VII. 20
In considering the disparate impact theory of Title VII, the ma-
jority found that the focus had never been the total number of mi-
nority members hired or promoted, but whether the challenged
practice was a discriminatory bar to individual employment oppor-
tunity.2' The Court found that the bottom line defense could serve
to deprive an individual of employment opportunity even when the
minority group is treated favorably.
The United States as amicus curiae argued that section 703(h)
of Title VII 22 protected the written examination at issue from attack
because the examination was not "used to discriminate" and the to-
tal process did not disproportionately deprive blacks of promo-
tions.23 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that section 703(h)
1982); I.M.A.G.E. v. Bailar, 518 F. Supp. 800, 804 (N.D. Cal. 1981), United States v. County
of Fairfax, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 662, 667 (E.D. Va. 1981).
16. 102 S. Ct. at 2531.
17. Id
18. Id See ,41bemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329 (1977).
19. 102 S. Ct. at 2531.
20. Id at 2531-32.
21. Id at 2532.
22. Section 703(h) of Title VII states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer. . . to give and to act upon the results of
any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration
or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
23. 102 S. Ct. at 2533.
1983]
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was only intended to protect the use of job-related tests and was not
meant to serve as a defense to discriminatory practices.2 4 The Court
also rejected defendants' argument that a favorable bottom line
should serve as an affirmative defense.25 The majority characterized
these arguments as "nothing more than a request that we redefine
the protections guaranteed by Title VII. ' 26
The dissenters27 argued that the majority decision was inconsis-
tent with the nature of disparate impact 28 because, while disparate
treatment focuses on the individual, disparate impact focuses on the
group.29 The dissenters pointed out that since 22.9% of the blacks
who entered the promotion process were actually promoted, com-
pared with 13.5% of the whites who entered the same process, 30 to
hold that such a selection process had a disparate impact was to
ignore reality.31 Accordingly, "[tihere can be no violation of Title
VII on the basis of disparate impact in the absence of disparate im-
pact on a group. '32 It was also argued that the majority confused
the aim of Title VII-the protection of individuals-with the meth-
ods of proof by which Title VII rights may be vindicated.33 In so
doing, the majority misconstrued the uniformly recognized distinc-
tion between disparate impact and disparate treatment. 34 Addition-
ally, the cases cited by the majority to support their position did not
do so, according to the dissenters.35 For instance, the majority cited
Dothard v. Rawlinson36 for the proposition that the bottom line is
not the determining factor in a disparate impact case. 37 The dissent-
ers, however, argued that the Dothard court did refer to the bottom
line when the Court discussed whether discriminatory height and
weight requirements had an adverse effect on the hiring decision.38
24. Id
25. Id at 2534.
26. Id
27. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor.
28. Id at 2536.
29. Id
30. Id at 2537.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id at 2538.
36. 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that the minimum height and weight requirements
used by the Alabama Board of Corrections had a discriminatory impact on women).
37. 102 S. Ct. at 2532-33.
38. Id at 2538.
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Other cases cited by the majority were also considered inappropriate
because they involved facially discriminatory policies, while Teal
involved a facially neutral policy. 39 "Today's decision takes a long
and unhappy step in the direction of confusion," 4 the dissenters
concluded.
Connecticut v. Teal is one of the most significant cases on dispa-
rate impact under Title VII in recent years. The case rejected a po-
sition which was previously accepted by the lower courts. It had
been held that a favorable bottom line would protect an employer
from liability for a discriminatory component of a selection process.
Teal made the bottom line defense no longer available against an
individual who brings suit.41 Teal did not, however, invalidate the
EEOC guidelines which normally prevent the government from tak-
ing action if the bottom line of the practice or procedure is
favorable. 42  The guidelines in effect at the time of Teal have not
been repealed or modified since the date of the decision.
After Teal, an employer must be prepared to prove the neces-
sity of any business selection practice having a disparate impact on
an individual minority member. This may be proven by a job vali-
dation study approved by the EEOC guidelines, 43 which can be ex-
pensive,' or the employer can show that the discriminatory portion
of the selection procedure is essential to his business operation. 45
The bottom line of the Teal decision for the employer is that he
must take a close look at any component of his selection process
having an adverse impact. For the individual minority member, the
Court's holding in Teal further clarifies his rights to equal employ-
ment opportunity under Title VII.
Robert S. Tschiemer
39. Id. at 2539. The dissenters argued that the majority also misapplied the opinions in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) and New York City Transit Authority
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) in their present analysis of those cases. 102 S. Ct. at 2538-39
n.6.
40. Id at 2539.
41. Id at 2529. The Eighth Circuit recently held in Ramirez v. City of Omaha, 678
F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1982), that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of disparate
impact because "the hiring process taken as a whole did not discriminate. ... Id at 753.
This case was decided one month before Teal and to the extent that Ramirez relied on the
bottom line as a defense it would be overruled by Teal.
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C) (1978).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5-.14 (1982).
44. 102 S. Ct. at 2539.
45. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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